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The Role of Departure States in Combatting Irregular Emigration in 







This paper examines the evolution over time of attempts to establish an international law 
principle that states have a legal responsibility, at least under certain circumstances, to combat 
irregular emigration, defined as the exit of individuals who would be arriving at their destination 
in a manner that is not compliant with the destination country’s immigration laws. Through 
examination of contemporaneous statements and travaux préparatoires during six separate 
negotiating episodes, I shed light on attempts to develop such a norm since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, along with the evolving set of legal and ethical justification that were used in 
the process. I also examine the different practical and principled objections that other states and 
civil society actors employed to oppose the development of such a legal norm. I conclude by 
arguing that this historic research challenges current perceptions that home state controls are of 
recent origin, and that international migration law is inherently progressive. 
 
 
International migration law, at least in its global incarnation, has mainly focused on the 
duties of destination states.
1
 These duties have most prominently included non-refoulement and 
protection of migrants’ rights. There are, however, other strands of international migration law 
that focus on the duties of states of origin and states of transit (collectively referred to here as 
departure states). In this paper, I explore one of these: namely the attempts over the past century 
to establish a duty to combat irregular emigration, defined here as the exit of individuals who 
would be arriving at their destination in a manner that is not compliant with the destination 
country’s immigration laws.
2
 In particular, I focus on the evolution of those legal and policy 
arguments used over time to try to establish such a duty, along with those arguments marshalled 
in opposition to the establishment of any such duty. This is a history that has to a certain extent 
been neglected by scholars, especially in contrast to the voluminous research on destination state 
duties in international migration law.
3
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 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘State Responsibility and the Country of Origin’ in Vera Gowlland-Debas (ed) The 
Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law Issues (Martinus Nijhoff 1995) 59. 
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 It should be acknowledged that while the term ‘irregular’ is commonly used in policy and academic circles (and 
among the state actors that are the focus of this article), some scholars have noted that characterising migrants’ 
‘regularity’ from a purely state-centric perspective can be problematic. See, eg, Anne McNevin, ‘Irregular Migrants, 
Neoliberal Geographies and Spatial Frontiers of “The Political”’ (2007) 33 Review of International Studies 655, 
655. 
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 Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Irregular Migration, State Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’ in Vincent Chetail and Céline 
Bauloz (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 84 (describing the 
‘dirty little secret of international cooperation to prevent people from leaving.’)  
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This paper will specifically examine the arguments presented in favour of such a duty 
along with the arguments marshalled against it during six sets of negotiations over the course of 
the twentieth century, from the futile attempts at global migration policymaking during the 1920s 
to the successful negotiation of the Smuggling Protocol in the late 1990s. In doing so, I trace a 
history of repeated attempts to develop departure state duties, largely spearheaded by developed 
destination states. I show how the legal and ethical justifications for these attempts have changed 
over time, in response to changing migration dynamics and political contexts, along with the 
growing normative acceptance during this period of the human right to leave any country, 
including one’s own. In my concluding section, I argue that this history challenges current 
perceptions that home state controls are of recent origin, and that international migration law is 
inherently progressive.  
Besides shedding light on the past, this a history with continued relevance.
4
 The 
imposition of a departure-state duty to combat irregular migration still presents a tempting 
prospect for destination states searching for a way to reduce irregular immigration without 
internalizing the costs of border securitization or mass deportations. While destination states 
have focused on bilateral efforts and anti-smuggling law in recent years, the basic idea of using 
legal and political toots to induce departure states to control irregular migration is now a 
prominent topic in migration management in Europe and elsewhere. Studying past efforts can 
provide insights into the arguments and justifications that have been successfully employed in 
the past (pro and contra) and which may be of similar use in contemporary discourse. 
Early Efforts to Develop a Home State Duty  
 As has been well documented by McAdam and others, there is a long (although contested 
and imperfectly implemented) tradition of free movement in pre-twentieth century international 
law and practice, including widespread acceptance of both the right to enter countries as well as 
the right to leave them.
5
 This started to change towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Restrictive immigration laws emerged in the 1880s in the United States, with the passage of the 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (prohibiting the immigration of Chinese labourers), soon followed 
by the 1882 Immigration Act (restricting immigration for the destitute and ill) and the 1885 
Foran Act (restricting immigration for those under contract to perform labour in the US).
6
 Soon 
after, governments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa adopted race-based 
immigration restrictions, followed by more comprehensive immigration laws in the early 
twentieth century.
7
 European countries experimented with a variety of migration policies during 
                                                          
4
 Edwin Odhiambo Abuya, ‘Past Reflections, Future Insights: African Asylum Law and Policy in Historical 
Perspective’ (2007) 19 International Journal of Refugee Law 51, 53 (a historical account can ‘enable one to 
appreciate the current challenges facing asylum regimes’). 
5
 Jane McAdam, ‘An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in International Law: The Right to Leave as a 
Personal Liberty’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1; Vincent Chetail, ‘The Transnational 
Movement of Persons under General International Law’ in Vincent Chetail and Céline Bauloz (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar 2014) 31-32. 
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 Claudia Sadowski-Smith, ‘Unskilled Labor Migration and the Illegality Spiral: Chinese, European, and Mexican 
Indocumentados in the United States, 1882-2007’ (2007) 60 American Quarterly 779, 786. 
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 Daniel Ghezelbash, ‘Legal Transfers of Restrictive Immigration Laws: A Historical Perspective’ (2017) 66 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 235. 
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 During this early period of immigration restrictions, destination countries such as the 
United States faced a difficult challenge in preventing the entry of those who did not comply 
with the newly restrictive laws.
9
 In the case of the Chinese Exclusion Act, for example, US 
government agents were tasked with distinguishing whether prospective migrants were actually 
labourers (as opposed to merchants, clergy, diplomats, teachers, tourists and students, who were 
permitted entry), through interviews, certificates of identity and the like. This proved near-
impossible; it was widely known at the time that fraudulent certificates and false identities were 
common.
10
 Trans-Atlantic migration was similarly associated with widespread irregularities.
11
 At 
Ellis Island, for example, corrupt officials reportedly provided thousands of prospective migrants 
with false entry documents, while ship officials were sometimes willing to illicitly ferry migrants 
to shore in return for a small bribe.
12
 
In response to the perceived failures in preventing irregular immigration, pressure arose 
in the US and elsewhere to shift immigration law enforcement to the prospective migrants’ home 
country. As one nativist commentator opined in 1905, ‘[f]or many years, the American people 
have carried on their fight single-handed against the admission of objectionable aliens. The day 
is apparently drawing near when the cooperation of foreign governments will be secured in 
reducing the volume of emigrant movement.’
13
 Externalising immigration regulation was 
effectuated in three main ways. First, for the major trans-Atlantic routes, the shipping companies 
were authorised to reject passage to those suspected or being unqualified to immigrate.
14
 
According to one contemporaneous observer, ‘the emigration from Italy, Austria-Hungary and 
Russia are carried by the English and German steamship lines, the officials of which exercise 
considerable vigilance in preventing the embarkation of passengers who are likely to be refused 
admission at American ports.’
15
 Shipping companies in fact had a strong incentive to take on 
board only those assured of entry to the destination country, because they were often held 
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 James Nafziger, ‘The General Admission of Aliens under International Law’ (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law 804; John Torpey, ‘Passports and the Development of Immigration Controls in the North Atlantic 
World during the Long Nineteenth Century’ in Andreas Fahrmeir et al (eds), Migration Control in the North 
Atlantic World (Berghahn 2003). 
9
 Sadowski-Smith (n 6) 784 (‘The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was the first federal legislation to create significant 
undocumented immigrant movement.’) 
10
 Immigration agents estimated that 70 to 90 percent of Chinese immigrants entered the country due to fraudulent 
claims. Adam McKeown, ‘Ritualization of Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States 
and China’ (2003) 108 American Historical Review 377, 378.  
11
 Sadowski-Smith (n 6) 789.   
12
 Ronald Bayor, Encountering Ellis Island: How European Immigrants Entered America (Johns Hopkins U Press 
2014) 113-115. 
13
 James Davenport Whelpley, ‘Control of Emigration in Europe’ (1905) 180 North American Review 856, 857. 
14
 In fact, carrier sanctions regarding arrival of unauthorised arrivals of Jews in Britain were put in place as far back 
as the 18
th
 century. Gina Clayton, ‘The UK and Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Entry Clearance and 
Juxtaposed Control’ in Bernard Ryan and Valsalmis Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal 





financially liable for repatriating individuals denied entry.
16
 These early controls prefigure the 
current carrier sanction schemes that have been much debated in recent years.
17
 
Second, the US and other destination states such as Canada and Australia requested 
permission from major departure states to allow their immigration officials to open offices in 
ports of embarkation in order to evaluate prospective immigrants as they boarded.
18
 Some 
nations allowed this to take place; other did not.
19
 Belgium, for example, did not welcome US 
agents to their ports.
20
 Mexico also refused to allow US immigration officials to be stationed on 
its territory to stop Chinese migration (Mexicans at the time could freely enter the US).
21
 
Third, departure states themselves enacted policies restricting emigration to those 
permitted to do so under the laws of the destination state. During the early twentieth century, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom passed laws prohibiting the 
emigration of individuals who would not be permitted to enter the state to which they were 
travelling.
22
 One related focus for some states was preventing emigration agents from promoting 
irregular migration. Thus, Portugal, for example, passed regulations providing that ‘an agent's 
licence shall be withdrawn if … promotes clandestine emigration’.
23
 In Switzerland, agents were 
‘forbidden to forward any person without a passport and identification paper or any person who 
cannot be admitted to the country of destination.’
24
 These clauses were in part intended to protect 
potential emigrants from suffering the indignity of sailing across the ocean, often after having 
sold their property, only to be rejected and sent back home, but a secondary benefit for 
destination countries was to reduce the number of unqualified entrants likely to attempt an 
irregular entry upon arrival.
25
 Many other departure states administered health checks at the port 
                                                          
16
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session, Report III, ‘Recruiting, Placing and Conditions of 
Labour (Equality of Treatment) of Migrant Workers’ (Geneva, 1938) 55; Bernard Ryan, ‘Extraterritorial 
Immigration Control: What Room for Legal Guarantees?' in Bernard Ryan and Valsalmis Mitsilegas (eds), 
Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges (Brill 2010) 19 (describing 1901 Australian scheme to 
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 See eg, Tilman Rodenhäuser, ‘Another Brick in the Wall: Carrier Sanctions and the Privatization of Immigration 
Control’ (2014) 26 International Journal of Refugee Law 223; Tendayi Bloom and Verena Risse, ‘Examining 
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18
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 58-59. 
19
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leaving Italian ports’). 
20
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21
 Sadowski-Smith (n 6) 787-88. 
22
 International Labour Office (1922) (n 16) 24. 
23
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 40.  
24





of embarkation, both as a means of detecting individuals likely to be denied entry by the 
destination state for health reasons, and as a means of cutting down on the risk of shipboard 
disease transmission.
26
 In other instances, departure states refused to cooperate in immigration 
law enforcement. For example, Chinese authorities issued assurances of merchant status for a 
year after passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, but then ceased cooperation, leaving US 
authorities to their own devices.
27
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the first efforts emerged to improve migration 
management through international agreements. From the start, one widely embraced objective 
was to ensure that departure states helped prevent irregular migration. Thus article two of a set of 
principles proposed by the Institut de Droit International (IDI) in 1897 specified that emigration 
would be forbidden to persons prohibited from immigrating by the laws of the destination state.
28
 
A few years later, during bilateral negotiations between the USA and Italy in 1908 for the 
organization of an international immigration and emigration conference, the programme drawn 
up by Italy (a major state of origin at the time) included a proposal on ‘whether, and if so under 
what conditions, it would be possible to organize special joint commissions which should verify 
at the ports of embarkation whether each person could or could not start for a certain destination, 
taking into account the laws in force in the countries of departure and arrival.’
29
 Certainly the US 
viewed pre-departure checks as an important objective as well, as revealed in the 1917 
Immigration Act, which authorised the President to call an international conference to, inter alia, 
‘secur[e] the assistance of foreign Governments in their own territories to prevent the evasion of 
the laws of the United States governing immigration’ and enter into ‘such international 
agreements as may be proper to prevent the immigration of aliens who, under the laws of the 
United States are or may be excluded from entering the United States’.
30
 
International migration negotiations began in earnest after the First World War, when a 
set of worldwide conferences and meetings were held with the intention of rationalizing 
migration management through the development of international norms.
31
 The first of these was 
the 1921 Conference of Emigration Countries, in Rome. Prior to the conference itself, the 
International Labour Office consulted member states on whether they wanted to unify departure 
and admissions formalities in the state of embarkation, and ‘nearly all’ agreed that this would be 
beneficial.
32
 In response, it proposed a five-article draft convention for the members’ 
consideration. The draft stated, inter alia, that parties shall establish examination offices in each 
port of emigration and at the chief frontier points through which emigrants pass, whose purpose 
                                                          
26
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 52 (citing policies in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
China and Japan). 
27
 McKeown (n 10) 385. 
28
 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit international, Vol. XVI, 253 (‘l'émigration sera interdite aux personnes auxquelles 
les lois de l'Etat d'immigration défendent d'immigrer). 
29
 International Labour Office, Report of the International Emigration Commission (August, 1921) 117.  
30
 Immigration Act of 5 February 1917, 39 Stat 874, sec 29. 
31
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 39-50. In parallel with these official meetings, 
trade unions and civil society groups also discussed migration governance at a series of meetings during these years, 
including at the Conference of the International Federation of Trade Unions, held in 1924 in Prague, and at the 
World Migration Congress, held in 1926 in London. Ibid, 50. 
32
 Report of the International Emigration Commission (n 29) 115. 
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would include checking ‘whether [emigrants] satisfy the legal provisions adopted in regard to 
entry into the country of immigration’.
33
 In the end, the treaty was not adopted. Throughout the 
1920s, a series of similar conferences also paid attention to the home state role in the migration 
process, although with more focus on medical and occupational qualification than on compliance 
with immigration laws per se.
34
 However, these meetings, too, failed to produce any new 
treaties, due to a basic inability to bridge the gap between the objectives of departure states and 
destination states (which at the time were instituting more restrictive and discriminatory 
immigration laws).
35
 Further attempts to reach agreement petered out amid the economic and 
political turmoil of the 1930s.
36
 
Destination states justified the administration of immigration laws in the departure state 
as an additional safeguard against irregular migration that could, in the words of the US 
Commissioner General of Immigration, help ‘to safeguard our country from the entrance of 
dangerous elements’.
37
 However, the idea of a departure state role in enforcing the immigration 
laws of the destination state was at this time also commonly justified as protective of the 
individual (and secondarily of the transport company or departure state that would be likely to 
foot the bill in case of refusal).
38
 Thus, the International Labour Organisation justified the 
administration of selection formalities in the port state by noting that [w]ould-be emigrants 
should be spared the distress and material loss which they suffer when, after having sold their 
goods and often even their small holdings … they are informed at the end of a long journey that 
they are rejected and must go back whence they came’
39
 Similarly, Louis Varlez noted that such 
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 Ibid, 119.  
34
 At the 1924 International Emigration and Immigration Conference, for example, attendees adopted a resolution 
asking states to ‘take steps to provide for medical examinations, before departure, of a sufficiently thorough 
character to reduce to a minimum the possibility of the emigrant being rejected on medical grounds at the port of 
landing’. International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 64. At the Second International 
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occupational selection of emigrants should be organised before their departure from the country of origin, so as to 
minimise the possibilities of conflicts arising in the country of immigration concerning the immigrants' occupational 
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35
 See Aristide Zolber, ‘Are the Industrial Countries under Siege?’ in Giacomo Luciani (ed), Migration Policies in 
Europe and the United States (Springer 1993) 57. 
36
 At the end of the 1930s, the International Labour Organization made a final pre-war attempt to address migration 
management with the 1939 Migration for Employment Convention (66), but the Convention never received any 
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37
 Report of the International Emigration Commission (n 29) 117. See also Whelpley (n 13) 261 (port state 
regulation is ‘of great value to a country like the United States, for it guarantees the arrival at American ports of very 
few who need be regarded with suspicion’). 
38
 This anticipates contemporary narratives supporting anti-irregular migration laws as protective of the health and 
safety of smuggled migrants. See, eg, BS Chimni, ‘The Birth of a Discipline: From Refugee to Forced Migration 
Studies’ (2009) 22 Journal of Refugee Studies 11. 
39
 International Labour Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session (n 16) 54. The British government expressed similar 
sentiments in its 1917 report on emigration, stating that ‘[w]e can hardly speak too strongly of the hardship which is 
involved when, after a home has been broken up and its occupants have sailed for a distant land, one member is 
rejected on arrival, and has to return in bitter disappointment.’ Report of the International Emigration Commission 
(n 29) 116. 
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controls were not only in the prospective emigrant’s interest, but also in the interest of departure 
states that might, in the end, be forced to pay his or her repatriation costs.
40
   
From a human rights perspective, Fauchille characterised state of origin controls on 
irregular emigration as a justifiable exception to the right to leave one’s country, for similar 
reasons of individual protection.
41
 Interestingly, however, one rights objection that arose (in 
discussion of the proposed 1897 IDI principles) was that home state prohibition of irregular 
emigration could potentially be used to legitimise unnecessary immigration laws, contrary to the 
tenor of article one of the principles, which provided for a general freedom of immigration 
except for restrictions necessary for the maintenance of social and political order.
42
 In the end, 
the drafters duly noted this concern and clarified that the home state prohibition must be read in 
conjunction with the article one protections on the right to immigrate.
43
 
Emigration to Palestine: 1945-48 
After the end of the Second World War, the home state role in combatting irregular 
migration once again become a pertinent issue, albeit in a very different context. During 1945-
48, there was a large scale migration of European Jews to the British Mandate of Palestine. This 
migration flow went against the wishes and regulations of the British government at the time, 
which was increasingly nervous about alienating Muslims from the Middle East and India.
44
 At 
the end of the Second World War, Britain continued a monthly quota of 1,500 entry certificates 
per month for Jewish immigrants, but this was not large enough to satisfy the migratory demands 
of European Jews, who continued to irregularly arrive by boats at numbers far exceeding the 
quota.
45
 With its attempts to confine or deport Jewish irregular migrants leading to unrest and 
criticism, Britain turned to diplomacy to persuade other European countries to prevent this 
exodus. These efforts were initially unsuccessful, with departure states such as France and 
Sweden asserting that they had no duty to concern themselves with whether emigrants had 
permission to legally enter their ultimate destination.
46
 In response to this initial rebuttal, the 
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 Louis Varlez, ‘Les Migrations Internationales et leur Réglementation’ (1927) 20 Recueil de Cours 259-60.  
41
 Paul Fauchille, ‘The Rights of Emigration and Immigration' (1924) 9 International Labour Review 317, 321 (‘the 
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42
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43
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‘Transnational Mobility, the International Law of Aliens, and the Origins of Global Migration Law’ (2017) 111 
AJIL Unbound 13, 14.  
44
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Soc 1990) 215; Steven Wagner, ‘British Intelligence and the ‘Fifth’ Occupying Power: The Secret Struggle to 
Prevent Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine’ (2014) 29 Intelligence & National Security 698, 706.. 
45
 Kochavi (n 44) 146. 
46
 Freddy Leibreich, British Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine, 1945-1948 
(Routledge 2005) 78-79 (citing French and Swedish correspondence). 
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Foreign Office’s Legal Advisor was tasked with studying whether a case could actually be made 
for an international legal duty for the states of departure to combat irregular migration. 
The Legal Advisor eventually replied that there was no specific rule of international law 
requiring a State to concern itself with the ultimate destination of persons leaving its territory.
47
 
However, he did qualify that conclusion by citing Oppenheim to claim that there was a general 
rule of international law that a state should ‘exercise due diligence to prevent persons within its 
territory from committing acts injurious to foreign states.’
48
 In the Palestinian context, he argued 
that departure states were violating this rule for five reasons: ‘(a) illegal immigration promotes 
civil strife; (b) its scale causes embarrassment to the government of Palestine; (c) it interferes 
with the fulfillment of HMG’s obligations; (d) it is a movement organised by states outside 
Palestine; (e) ships carrying immigrants are frequently armed’.
49
 In addition, the Legal Advisor 
noted that the burden of additional travel control that states of departure would bear would not be 
out of proportion to the injury caused by irregular migration.
50
  
When the Legal Advisor’s assertion of the international legal duty to prevent irregular 
migration to Palestine was conveyed to various European countries, it was uniformly rejected.
51
 
This is perhaps unsurprising; within Europe there was very little political benefit to attempts to 
stop Jewish emigration to Palestine. In France and Italy in particular there was considerable 
empathy among politicians both for the fate of Jewish holocaust survivors and for Zionist 
national aspirations.
52
  Elsewhere, as in Poland, Jewish emigration was seen as a means of 
avoiding property claims (from Jews returning to find their homes seized) and currying favour 
with the US, which at this time supported Jewish migration to Palestine.
53
 Sweden simply 
objected that their domestic law did not empower the examination of emigrants to see if they had 
a valid exit visa or not.
54
 While the ‘right to leave one’s country’ does not seem to have been a 
prominent objection at this time, by early 1948 the British apparently foresaw it as a potential 
hurdle, and proposed that the newly formed UN Human Rights Commission specify in the 
International Covenant on Human Rights that restrictions on the right to emigrate are permitted 
in order to fight illegal immigration.
55
 This request was eventually refused, with drafters 
                                                          
47








 Ibid (noting reactions from Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, the Hague, Athens and Belgrade). The British later used 
other methods to get the attention of departure states, including the sabotage of five ships in Italian ports, and the 
refoulement of Jewish migrants in the Exodus 1947 incident, where French agents famously refused to force 
disembarkation. Wagner (n 44). 
52
 Liebreich (n 46) 60; 74-6. 
53
 Laurent Rucker, ‘Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949’, Cold War International History 
Project Working Paper No 46 (2005) 13. Romania, meanwhile, permitted such emigration on condition that the Jews 
give up their property and money before leaving. Ibid, 29. 
54
 Liebreich (n 46) 78. 
55
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights at Lake 
Success, 24 May to 18 June 1948, UN Doc E/800 (28 June 1948), 26. 
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preferring to list broad grounds for limiting right to free movement in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
56
 
Setting aside practical and political objections, the British legal assertion that irregular 
migration should be considered an injurious act covered by the general duty to prevent the 
private commission of injurious acts was not particularly convincing. In practice, this duty had 
previously been cited by states mainly in the context of the prevention of acts of violence against 
foreign states from being plotted or undertaken from within another state’s borders.
57
 While the 
British legal argument was new, it did not emerge entirely out of the blue. In his 1930 Hague 
lecture, Charles Dupuis had argued that states should discourage emigration towards destinations 
where emigrants were not wanted by analogising to the imprudence of an individual forcing open 
the door of a household where he was not welcome.
58
 More prominently, Sir Robert Jennings 
had in 1939 proposed that Nazi Germany should be held liable under international law for 
damages suffered by Britain and other states in supporting destitute Jewish refugees who had 
been forced to leave the country in penury.
59
 This proposition of home-state responsibility for 
refugee support did not gain any diplomatic traction, but has proved relatively popular among 
succeeding generations of refugee law scholars.
60
 The idea of a customary international law duty 
to prevent irregular migration, on the other hand, has largely fallen by the wayside. 
ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No 143)
61
  
During the period from World War II until the early 1970s, curtailing irregular migration 
was – with certain exceptions – not a major priority in most of the world.
62
 Sustained economic 
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growth led to a demand for manpower in many western countries, which could only be met by 
migrants, whether or not they had legal status.
63
 Thus when the International Labour Conference 
adopted the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), the focus was on assuring 
prospective migrants possessed accurate information and ensuring equal treatment for migrant 
workers and nationals in various respects.
64
 There were no provisions regarding a home state 
obligation to combat irregular migration, although the Annexes did contain clauses mandating 
the punishment of any person who promoted clandestine or illegal immigration.
65
  
The number of irregular immigrants accelerated sharply in the 1970s, however, just as the 
oil crises and subsequent economic pressures began to reduce economic growth, priming 
politicians in western countries to pay renewed attention to effectively combatting irregular 
migration.
66
 Within this context, the immediate factors prompting renewed international attention 
to irregular migration were a series of incidents involving the death or injury of smuggled 
migrants.
67
  Most notable among them was the 1972 discovery of a sealed truck transporting 59 
‘barely alive’ migrant workers from West Africa that broke down in the Mont Blanc tunnel, a 
short distance away from Geneva, where the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was 
meeting at the time.
 68
 At the behest of the Kenyan delegate, ECOSOC passed a resolution soon 
thereafter condemning clandestine trafficking in migrant workers, and their exploitation, and 
requesting governments to act against those responsible. ECOSOC also requested that the 
Commission of Human Rights consider the question and that the ILO energetically examine the 
matter.
69
 In time, this led to the negotiation of Convention 143 at the International Labour 
Conference, along with the adoption of various resolutions by the UN General Assembly and 
ECOSOC condemning abuses of smuggled and trafficked migrants.
70
 
Initially the negotiations for ILO Convention 143 were focused on stopping the abusive 
or clandestine movement of migrant workers (including by combatting irregular migration itself 
and by combatting the employment of irregular migrants).
71
 Soon, however, there was pressure 
to address migrant worker rights in the same document. Most employers groups argued in favour 
                                                          
63
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of maintaining an exclusive focus on ‘combat[ting] illicit and clandestine migrations’, perhaps 
with the addition of a separate recommendation on equality of opportunity and treatment.
72
 
However, the majority opinion was that preventing abusive or clandestine migration and migrant 
rights should be included in two parts of the same Convention.
73
 Eventually, the Convention 
evolved to contain two parts: the first dealt with migration in abusive conditions, and the second 
provided for equal rights between migrant workers and nationals in various respects.
74
 The 
resulting link between the prevention of irregular migration and the rights of migrants has 
endured through ensuing treaty negotiations. 
While the negotiations surrounding the treaty were clearly focused on protecting the 
safety of migrants and preventing their exploitation, one early question in the discussion was 
whether the treaty should attempt to curtail migration ‘in abusive conditions’ or rather all forms 
of irregular migration. The US governmental delegate, supported by the Canadian government 
delegate, argued for the latter, submitting a proposal to alter the proposed treaty title so that it 
referred to ‘illicit and clandestine migrations’ instead of ‘migrations in abusive conditions’.
75
  
This was rejected, but a certain ambiguity characterised the debate going forward. For example, 
the Holy See delegate discussed abusiveness and clandestineness as if they were synonyms, 
stating that ‘migrations in abusive conditions [represented] a veritable scandal of our age. No 
words are too strong to condemn clandestine migration’.
76
 A separate issue arose as to whether 
the right to leave should be specifically cited, as demanded by the US government and worker 
delegates and the Migrant Worker Committee’s employer members.
77
 Discussion surrounding 
this issue was highly politicised (as it was throughout the 1970s), with the US workers’ delegate 
decrying widespread violations of the right to migrate in the Communist bloc.
78
 The records 
show no questioning of potential tension between the right to leave and the duty to combat 
abusive or clandestine migration. 
In the end, the preamble did explicitly cite the right to leave, although it was omitted 
from the operative clauses, due to a stated fear of encouraging a ‘brain drain’.
79
 Meanwhile the 
treaty’s final language awkwardly conflated the duty to address clandestine migration and the 
duty to address abusive migrations. Article three states that:  
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[e]ach Member shall adopt all necessary and appropriate measures, both within its 
jurisdiction and in collaboration with other Members—(a) to suppress clandestine 
movements of migrants for employment […] in order to prevent and to eliminate 
the abuses referred to in Article 2 of this Convention.
80
 
However, article two does not mention any ‘abuses’; rather it requires states to investigate 
whether migrant workers have been subjected to any ‘conditions contravening relevant 
international multilateral or bilateral instruments or agreements, or national laws or 
regulations’.
81
 According to the ILO Committee of Experts, ‘abusive conditions’ therefore refers 
to any conditions which are prohibited by international instruments or national laws or 




The International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers
83
 
 ILO Convention 143 proved unpopular among both departure and destination states. 
Adopted in June 1975, it only received nine ratifications by the end of 1980, and currently has 23 
parties.
84
 Destination countries were reluctant to endorse the recognition of rights of irregular 
migrants, while other countries, such as Mexico, felt that the convention did not go far enough in 
recognizing the rights of irregular but tolerated migrants.
85
 Some developing countries were also 
unhappy with the convention’s stance against clandestine migration.
86
 By 1979, Mexico and 
Morocco took the lead in proposing a resolution at the UN General Assembly for the elaboration 
of a new rights-focused legal instrument.
87
 The UN forum was seen as more receptive to 
developing country needs, as it would allow for a majority of developing country governmental 
representatives, which was not the case in the tripartite ILO.
88
 
In contrast to ILO Convention 143, it was always understood that migrant rights would 
be at the heart of the UN treaty. However, it soon became clear that destination states also 
wanted to include a duty to address irregular migration.
89
 As negotiations continued in meetings 
of the Working Group, the precise language regarding a duty to address clandestine or irregular 
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migration became a point of debate between departure and destination states. European 
countries, with the support of the United States, proposed that the treaty require collaboration 
with a view to ‘preventing’ and ‘eliminating’ or ‘suppressing’ illegal or clandestine movements 
of migrant workers and their families.
90
 However, the Mexican representative objected to the 
notion of prevention and suppression, arguing that this could seriously restrict the right to leave 
one’s country.
91
 A group of developing countries including Turkey, India, Jamaica, Algeria, and 
the Dominican Republic proposed replacing the word ‘suppressing’ by words such as 
‘discouraging’, ‘curbing’ or ‘combating’.
92
 Sweden and France objected, arguing that the phrase 
‘suppress clandestine movement of migrants for employment’ should be maintained because it 
was already commonplace in the UN and other international organizations, and had been recently 
agreed to in Convention 143.
93
 In fact, this appeal to precedent becomes more understandable 
when one considers that the ILO had in 1981 been drawn in as draftsman for the MESCA 
(Mediterranean and Scandinavian) group, and was institutionally concerned with ensuring the 
continued relevance of its past treaties, including Convention 143.
94
 
Another debate emerged over the Convention’s purpose during discussion of the 
preambular clauses. Some European delegations thought that the purpose should be to ‘prevent 
illegal migration, to suppress clandestine movements of migrants and combat the illicit traffic of 
workers’ and that therefore reference to the rights of undocumented workers should be omitted in 
order to avoid encouraging illicit migration.
95
 A group of developing countries led by Mexico 
and Algeria rejected this idea, however, arguing that basic labour rights must be provided to 
irregular workers, and that this should not be seen as an encouragement to illicit migration.
96
 
In the end, prevention of clandestine migration was included in a preambular clause, 
albeit couched in human rights-friendly language.
97
 Meanwhile, the final version of article 68 
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calls for state parties, specifically including transit states, to ‘collaborate with a view to 
preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine movements’, including through measures to 
‘detect and eradicate illegal or clandestine movements of migrant workers and members of their 
families’.
98
 This final language represents a surprisingly forceful approach to irregular migration, 
and has led to divergent interpretations by commentators. According to Bosniak, article 68 
requires ‘states to undertake control measures to end the process of clandestine migration’.
99
 
However, Ryan argues that the language in article 68 ‘potentially covers both control measures 
and pre-emptive policies designed to remove the basis for irregular migration.’
100
 The article has 
been cited by the Committee on the Rights of Migrant Workers either in very general terms, or 
with recommendations of compliance through non-coercive measures and anti-smuggling 
policies.
101
 The Committee has spoken out against the criminalisation of irregular emigration.
102
 
Indo-Chinese Refugee Crisis 
 Just as negotiations for the ICRMW were getting started in 1979, what has been called 
the Indo-Chinese Refugee Crisis was receiving increased international attention. Over the 
preceding years, hundreds of thousands of (mainly) Vietnamese had fled their country by land 
and, more prominently, by sea, for a range of political and socio-economic reasons related 
largely to tensions stemming from the end of the Vietnam War and Vietnam’s ensuing conflicts 
with Kampuchea and China.
103
 By early 1979, initial asylum countries in East and Southeast 
Asia felt unable to handle the outflow, and in many cases pushed boats back out to sea, with 
predictably grave humanitarian consequences.
104
  
While neighbouring countries tended to avoid explicit references to international law, 
perhaps reflecting a general reluctance to legalize disputes in the region, by early 1979 they were 
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making clear statements that Vietnam was responsible for the exodus, and should put a stop to 
unauthorised boat departures.
105
 Just as Britain had done earlier in the Palestinian case (and so 
many states do today), neighbouring countries characterised the maritime departures as a 
destabilising security concern.
106
 Vietnam’s response was essentially defensive. It argued (not 
entirely unconvincingly) that the deprivation and tensions leading to widespread departures were 
not of its own making, rather stemming from difficulties associated with the aftermath of 
American depredation during the Vietnam War, along with Chinese interference.
107
 It also 
argued (far less convincingly) that it was doing its best to prevent irregular emigration, which 
was in fact severely dealt with by Vietnamese law.
108
  
With the situation threatening to spiral out of control, the UN Secretary General called 
together a conference of 65 countries in Geneva to try to find a comprehensive solution. The 
conference led to a variety of commitments by relevant parties, at the heart of which were the 
provision of thousands of new places by resettlement countries, the agreement of initial asylum 
countries to cease push-backs, an increase in funding for UNHCR and other parties addressing 
the situation on the ground, and the Vietnamese acceptance of an orderly departure program and 
a six-month moratorium (originally proposed by France, and supported by the US and UK) on 
irregular departures.
109
 The agreement that emerged out of Geneva was not in the form of a 
legally binding treaty, but the Geneva discourse can nevertheless shed light on the evolution of 
legal arguments surrounding the prevention of irregular emigration. While Vietnam, with its 
ambivalent attitude towards international human rights law, may not have felt comfortable 
relying on the ‘right to leave’, the UN and Western countries could no longer simply ignore this 
principle, which had been incorporated into binding international law three years earlier with the 
entry into force of the ICCPR.
110
 Rather, some sort of justification was necessary for pressuring 
Vietnam into a moratorium on unauthorised exits, and in this case the justification commonly 
chosen by France and the UN was the protection of human lives.
111
 This contrasts with the tenor 
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of arguments from a few years earlier, which (in a very different context) were more focused on 
combatting ‘abusiveness’. UNHCR was less willing to vocally support the outcome; many of its 
staff expressed reservations to the moratorium, and in the end it silently acquiesced to this 
element of the agreement.
112
 What is also clear from this episode is that the international 
community was asking Vietnam to undertake exceptional action in stopping unauthorised 
departures, and not to fulfil their pre-existing legal duties (in contrast to the British argument of 
thirty years prior). 
There was some public criticism that the plan denied Vietnamese the right to leave.
113
 
However, the commitments made at the Geneva Conference were relatively promptly carried 
out, and largely (if temporarily) achieved the objective of curtailing maritime departures.
114
 The 
Geneva Conference has since been lauded as an important example of successful international 
cooperation on refugee matters.
115
 However, commentators have also been critical of the 
techniques used by the Vietnamese government to combat irregular emigration, which included 
the arrests of thousands, some of whom were executed.
116
 While the moratorium on irregular 
departures was a country-specific measure to deal with a crisis, the experience also led to 
renewed attention to the broader issue of preventing refugee outflows at the global level and 
initiatives to study the topic were introduced by Canada in the UN Human Rights Commission 
and Germany in the UN General Assembly.
117
 The latter resulted in a General Assembly 
resolution calling for international cooperation to avert new refugee flows.
118
 Both the Canadian 
and German initiatives were focused on the prevention of conflict, persecution and other 
humanitarian disasters rather than on keeping desperate people at home, but the initiatives 
nevertheless raised concerns that the right to leave one’s country was being weakened.
119
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The Migrant Smuggling Protocol
120
 
The question of how best to keep people at home also emerged during negotiations for 
the Smuggling Protocol. Unlike the ICRMW, negotiation towards the Smuggling Protocol was 
largely a developed country initiative: Italy first called for a treaty on ‘smuggling of people by 
sea’, setting the process in motion, however the mandate soon evolved so as to encompass land-
based smuggling as well.
121
 These negotiations took place under the aegis of the UN General 
Assembly Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Unlike the other negotiations 
discussed in this paper, the focus here was never on preventing irregular emigration per se; 
rather, the aim was combatting and criminalizing human smuggling. Nevertheless, it was always 
evident that this would in fact have an effect on home state suppression of irregular emigration, 
in two principal ways.  
First, to the extent that smuggling is suppressed, irregular emigration will in many areas 
naturally decrease, given the large proportion of irregular migrants who rely on the assistance of 
smugglers (and the difficulty of migrating without them).
122
 According to 2003 figures from 
IOM, approximately half of global irregular migration takes place with the assistance of people 
smugglers.
123
 For some migration routes, the percent is far higher: according to Europol, over 
90% of irregular migrants to arrive in Europe in 2015 used a smuggler or other service to 
facilitate their voyage.
124
 Without the assistance of human smugglers, the number of people 
attempting these migration routes would be likely to decrease considerably. 
Second, many of the measures that would potentially be useful for combat human 
smuggling are also effective in combatting irregular emigration undertaken independently. 
During the Protocol’s negotiations, there was considerable discussion regarding which tools 
states should use. Developing countries (and the Vatican) advocated for the specific inclusion of 
clauses that would require states of origin to encourage the negotiation of more multilateral and 
bilateral migration agreements
125
 and promote economic and social development in the regions 
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where prospective migrants originated.
126
 These measures would presumably help reduce 
irregular emigration as well as human smuggling, but in a fundamentally non-coercive manner.  
Developed destination countries also advocated for a range of strengthened border 
controls, which would naturally lead to greater apprehension of irregular emigrants along with 
human smugglers. For example, the early proposal for prevention language stated that all parties 
shall strengthen ‘border controls, including by checking persons and travel or identity 
documents, and, where appropriate, by inspecting and seizing vehicles and vessels’.
127
 These 
developed country proposals were viewed with some wariness by UNHCR, UNESCO and IOM; 
in a joint set of comments, these agencies argued that ‘[t]he strengthening of border controls and 
other measures foreseen in the draft Protocol to prevent the smuggling of migrants should be 
implemented in such a manner that they will not undermine the rights of individuals to seek 
asylum’.
128
 In fact, some argue that stronger border controls exacerbate the problem of migrant 
smuggling by making irregular migration more difficult to independently engage in.
129
 
 In the end, both types of preventive tools were included in the Protocol. Article 15 
requires State Parties to increase public awareness of the criminal nature of human smuggling; 
cooperate in the field of public awareness, and promote or strengthen development programs that 
combat the root socio-economic causes of migrant smuggling.
130
 Meanwhile, border control is 
addressed in article 11. Article 11(1) states that ‘[w]ithout prejudice to international 
commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, to the 
extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect the smuggling of 
migrants’ and Article 11(3), provides (in language proposed by the European Community) that 
‘[w]here appropriate, and without prejudice to applicable international conventions, such 
measures shall include establishing the obligation of commercial carriers, including any 
transportation company or the owner or operator of any means of transport, to ascertain that all 
passengers are in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the receiving 
State.’
131
 The concerns brought up by UNHCR and others were dealt with in a savings clause.
132
 
In addition, an entry was placed in the travaux préparatoires to specifically note that ‘measures 
and sanctions applied in accordance with [article 11] should take into account other international 
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obligations of the State Party concerned’.
133
 Nevertheless, article 11 of the Protocol has met with 
criticism; according to Rodenhäuser, ‘under the guise of crime prevention, migration destination 
states have succeeded in furthering stricter migration policies internationally. Rejecting a person 
at the point of embarkation without further investigation does not address the crime of smuggling, 
but enhances border control’.
134
  
The Smuggling Protocol thus represents an interesting shift in the discourse on home 
state duties. Departure states (and indeed all state parties) are not specifically required to combat 
irregular migration per se; rather, they must combat human smuggling.
135
 This shift is noticeable 
elsewhere in the global discourse as well, one example being the Global Migration Group’s 
Statement that it will support: ‘efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration [along 
with] prevention, cooperation and protection measures in respect of trafficking and smuggling of 
human beings’
136
 Yet, for many observers, the distinction between combatting smuggling and 
combatting irregular emigration is a distinction without a difference. As one Working Group 
report notes, ‘often the focus on border controls is on preventing and detecting irregular 
migration rather than on preventing and detecting smuggling of migrants’.
137
 This is particularly 
evident with the carrier sanctions of article 11(3). From a human smuggling perspective, forcing 
prospective irregular emigrants off of common carriers may in fact be counter-productive, as it 
would force them to use more clandestine means of emigration, for which they would more 
likely require the assistance of smugglers. 
Conclusion 
As this paper shows, there have been efforts since the early days of modern international 
migration law to impose a duty to combat irregular emigration upon states of origin and transit. 
These efforts, largely spearheaded by destination states, have employed a shifting set of legal 
principles, normative arguments, and institutional frameworks. They have met with only very 
limited success, perhaps surprisingly given that such norms have been periodically embraced by 
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relatively powerful states. Early attempts at establishing treaty norms based largely on a 
protective justification faltered, as did the British assertion of a customary international law duty 
not to harm other states. Expectations that ILO negotiations would firmly establish a duty to 
combat clandestine migration were only partially fulfilled, as drafters focussed on combatting 
migrations in abusive conditions. Western states managed to preserve the idea of a departure 
state duty in the ICRMW, but saw it de-emphasized, with the prevention of irregular migration 
shifted down to article 68 of a convention firmly focused on individual rights.  
Most recently, western proponents of a departure state duty have met with more success 
by addressing the issue in a roundabout way, through the establishment of international norms 
concerning human smuggling. In essence this is an admission of the impossibility of negotiating 
a departure state duty at the global level, but at the same time it manages to target most irregular 
migration flows (which now rely on smugglers), while adhering to the protective justification. 
They have also turned to bilateral deals, thus negating the bargaining power of developing 
countries in multilateral settings and allowing for a more nakedly transactional approach to the 
issue.
138
 This shift towards bilateral attempts to induce departure states to combat irregular 
emigration was evident in the European Union’s agreements with its eastern neighbours (and 
prospective members) since the late 1990s, and has more recently influenced the policies of both 
the EU itself and certain member states with respect to several African, Middle Eastern and Latin 
American partners.
139
 Perhaps the most prominent bilateral agreement has been the 2016 EU-
Turkey deal, which the parties pledged to end irregular migration of mainly Syrian asylum-
seekers from Turkey to the EU ‘in order to break the business model of the smugglers and to 
offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk’.
140
  These bilateral deals show no sign 
of abating, as can be seen by the controversial recent agreement between Italy and Libyan 
authorities aimed (in part) at combatting irregular departures of migrants across the 
Mediterranean.
141
 With negotiations for a Global Migration Compact in full swing, it will be 
interesting to see whether destination states will show renewed interest in establishing the idea of 
a general home state duty to combat irregular migration in international law. The presence of 
such efforts throughout recent history implies that their renewal is not an impossibility, perhaps 
(as discussed by Wilde) in response to progressive developments elsewhere.
142
 
This paper can be interpreted as challenging current conceptions of migration governance 
in two principal ways. First, it challenges the perceived ‘newness’ of current extraterritorial 
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migration deterrence policies. Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen characterise cooperation based 
non-entrée policies as a ‘new generation’ that emerged from the diminished viability of 
traditional non-entrée policies over the past two decades.
143
 Others commonly date the origin of 
deterrence policies to the 1980s.
144
 It is certainly true that non-entrée policies have become far 
more prominent during this period, including attempts by destination states to pressure or induce 
departure states to reduce migration flows. However, as this paper shows, the desire to 
extraterritorialise migration control has deep roots, and contemporary agreements such as the 
Smuggling Protocol or EU-Turkey Agreement can be seen as the continuation of long-standing 
efforts. Of course, while efforts to induce departure states to crack down on irregular departures 
may not be entirely new, there certainly are important differences between current policies and 
those which came before, perhaps most notably as relates to motivation: contemporary states 
seem focused on externalising migration controls as a means of avoiding Refugee Convention 
non-refoulement obligations that become effective upon reaching the border, which was not a 
focal point in prior negotiations.
145
  
Second, it challenges the perception of global migration law as a necessarily progressive 
or border-opening discipline, at least within what Spiro terms its ‘human rights track’.
146
 In this 
standard conception, international migration law norms and principles are liberalising by nature, 
and generally butt up against the external (to the discipline) defensive principle of sovereignty 
(as wielded by states, judges, etc) in the discourse regarding international regulation of human 
mobility.
147
 This fundamental dialectic has been observed by many scholars in relation to both 
international migration law and international human rights law.
148
 However, my paper illustrates 
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that even within those norms and institutions that form the backbone of human rights-oriented 
international migration law, there have been counter-currents and attempted counter-currents of 
border tightening. In short, the discipline of international migration law is a product of state 
action, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, there have thus been efforts by states to endow its norms 
with a less progressive character in times when irregular migration is seen as a threat. 
It is also clear, however, that this paper should not be seen as challenging the quite 
widespread legal and moral condemnation of current regional and bilateral efforts to impose 
duties on states of origin and transit to prevent irregular emigration.
149
 Numerous international 
law scholars have concluded that in many or all cases, policies of preventing irregular emigration 
represent a violation of international law by states of departure (normally focusing specifically 
on the ICCPR or the Fourth Optional Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights).
150
 
Others have convincingly argued that destination states can also be responsible under those same 
treaties for their complicity in preventing departures.
151
 At the very least, extraterritorial 
immigration controls represent a legal regime that is favourable to destination states and is 
premised on an imbalance in power between the departure and destination states.
152
 Meanwhile, 
a range of academic and media commentators have highlighted the negative humanitarian 
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consequences (intended and unintended) of coercive policies to prevent asylum seekers from 
leaving states of origin and transit.
153
  
This paper does not affect these conclusions. While there may be a history of attempts to 
establish a legal duty to prevent irregular departure, these attempts have been largely 
unsuccessful, and surely do not show sufficient state practice or opinio juris to from any 
customary international law obligation to prevent irregular emigration. Nor does a history of 
attempts to prevent irregular emigration make current attempts to do so any less ethically 
objectionable. Motivations, techniques and results matter, and even if the prevention of irregular 
emigration might be defensible in some situations, prominent scholars have argued 
(convincingly, in my opinion)  that it is morally wrong to forcibly preventing desperate asylum 
seekers from leaving for Europe when the end result is (for example) for them to face 
confinement and exploitation in war-torn Libya, languish in destitution in Lebanon or Niger, or 
face potential refoulement to Iraq or Afghanistan.
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